From Council to Capability: Building a Red Sea Security Architecture
The Red Sea is not simply a body of water separating Northeast Africa from the Arabian Peninsula. It is a shared economic, political and security environment connecting the Mediterranean, Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. The states surrounding it have an obvious interest in keeping maritime routes open, protecting ports and coastal infrastructure, countering trafficking and piracy, managing environmental risks and preventing regional conflicts from threatening international navigation.
For many years, however, security in the Red Sea has depended heavily on external naval deployments, bilateral relationships and temporary coalitions assembled in response to particular crises. Recent developments suggest a renewed effort to change that.
The Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (the Red Sea Council) is receiving renewed attention after years of limited institutional progress. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has led the establishment of a broader multinational maritime-defence coalition intended to strengthen security across the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden.
Both developments should be viewed positively. Regional states are entitled to take greater ownership of a maritime environment on which their security and economic futures depend. But the creation of a council or coalition is the political beginning, not the operational result. The real test will be whether participating states can build the institutions, doctrine, personnel and systems required to act together effectively over many years.
The Red Sea Council’s Original Ambition
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and Yemen signed the Red Sea Council’s founding charter in Riyadh in January 2020. The initiative was significant. It brought together Arab and African littoral states within a formal regional structure intended to strengthen coordination and cooperation around shared political, economic and security interests. Saudi Arabia described the Council as a joint-action system through which member states could coordinate their efforts and protect the strategic waterway.
That ambition extended beyond naval activity. A sustainable Red Sea framework could support economic integration, infrastructure, trade, environmental protection, port development, migration management, counter-trafficking and crisis coordination alongside maritime security. In that respect, ASEAN provides a more useful long-term comparison than NATO. ASEAN’s development has rested on the gradual construction of political-security, economic and socio-cultural pillars. It has not removed national sovereignty or made every member identical. It has created processes through which diverse states can meet, develop shared plans, manage differences and deepen cooperation incrementally.
The Red Sea Council could evolve through a similarly patient model suited to its own region. It does not need to reproduce ASEAN’s institutions. But it can learn from the importance of permanent mechanisms, agreed work programmes and sustained implementation between high-level meetings.
Why Progress Has Been Difficult
The Council was created in an exceptionally challenging environment. Its members have different political systems, economic resources, security capabilities and national priorities. Several have faced war, internal political transition, institutional fragility or serious economic pressure. Relations between regional powers have also shaped the wider Red Sea environment, while countries outside the Council maintain substantial commercial, political and military interests in the waterway.
The exclusion of influential actors has been another persistent challenge. The United Arab Emirates is not a littoral state but has significant port, commercial and security interests across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Ethiopia does not have a Red Sea coastline, yet its population, economy, regional influence and search for dependable maritime access make it central to the surrounding strategic environment.
There is also a structural question and that is whether the Council is primarily a political forum, an economic-cooperation organisation, a maritime-security body or the foundation of something broader. Excessive ambition without prioritisation can leave a young institution responsible for everything but operationally capable of little. None of these difficulties invalidates the Council. They explain why regional institution building takes time. The task now is to convert renewed political attention into a limited number of practical and achievable programmes that demonstrate value to every member.
The New Maritime Coalition Changes the Context
On 30 July 2026, Saudi Arabia announced plans for a multinational maritime-defence coalition focused on strengthening maritime security, safeguarding freedom of navigation and protecting trade routes, energy supplies and shared interests across the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. Fourteen countries initially endorsed the initiative, with participation extending beyond the Red Sea Council’s eight members.
The coalition responds to a more immediate security requirement. Disruption in the Red Sea has demonstrated how rapidly attacks, blockades or regional escalation can affect shipping, insurance, energy flows, port activity and global supply chains. Its creation also reflects a wider strategic change with regional states seeking greater responsibility for the security of critical waterways rather than relying exclusively on externally led missions.
The Council and coalition should not be treated as interchangeable. The Red Sea Council is a permanent political and regional framework composed of littoral states. The maritime coalition is a wider defence arrangement designed around a specific operational purpose. Their memberships, authorities and time horizons differ. If managed carefully, they could be complementary. The Council can provide regional legitimacy, political dialogue and long-term institution building. The coalition can concentrate on maritime coordination, operational readiness and the development of deployable capability.
If their mandates remain unclear, however, parallel structures could duplicate meetings, divide resources and create uncertainty about which institution leads during a crisis.
An “Arab NATO” Cannot Be Declared into Existence
Regional security initiatives are frequently described as possible versions of NATO. The comparison is understandable, particularly when a coalition seeks collective action or closer military cooperation. It can also conceal the scale of the task.
NATO was established in 1949. Its present interoperability is the result of more than 75 years of political consultation, standardisation, joint planning, investment, exercises, operational experience and continual institutional development. NATO defines interoperability as the ability of allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently in pursuit of tactical, operational and strategic objectives. That requires forces and systems to communicate, use common doctrine and procedures, and operate through compatible infrastructure and support arrangements.
This is why the expression “NATO standard” carries meaning. It does not refer to one universal certificate. NATO maintains an extensive standardisation system, including Standardization Agreements, commonly known as STANAGs, that allow participating forces to establish common or compatible ways of working. These arrangements cover far more than weapons and ships. They influence terminology, mapping, communications, reporting, medical support, logistics, ammunition, fuel, command procedures, information exchange and countless other details that determine whether multinational forces can operate safely and effectively together. A new coalition may possess capable national forces. That does not mean those forces are immediately interoperable.
The Practical Barriers to Interoperability
The states associated with the emerging maritime coalition bring valuable geography, personnel, facilities and operational experience. They also bring different military traditions, languages, equipment, procurement histories, training systems and command cultures. Those differences create several practical challenges.
Common doctrine and terminology
Participants must agree how they understand the mission, describe the operating environment and conduct core tasks. Even familiar terms can carry different meanings across national forces. Shared terminology is therefore not administrative detail; it is a safety and command requirement. Doctrine must also establish how participating forces conduct surveillance, escort, interdiction, search and rescue, incident response and other agreed activities. Without it, units may be present in the same area without operating as one force.
Command, control and political authority
A coalition needs to know who commands what, under which circumstances and within what national restrictions. Political leaders may agree on the importance of maritime security while holding different positions on the use of force, intelligence sharing or operations involving particular state and non-state actors. National forces may remain under domestic command even when contributing to a coalition mission. These issues require clear command relationships, rules of engagement, legal mandates and escalation processes. They cannot be resolved safely for the first time during an incident.
Communications and information exchange
Ships, aircraft, coastal stations and command centres must be able to exchange information securely and rapidly. Technical compatibility is only one part of the problem. Participating states must also agree what information can be shared, at which classification, with whom and through what release procedures. Trust develops gradually. A realistic model may begin with shared maritime-domain awareness, liaison officers and agreed incident reporting before progressing towards more sensitive intelligence exchange.
Training and professional development
Interoperability is developed by people before it is demonstrated by platforms. Personnel need common training outcomes, staff procedures and opportunities to work alongside counterparts from other countries. Commanders and planners require multinational education; operators need repeated practice; instructors need a shared methodology; and lessons from exercises must lead to changes in doctrine and training. One joint exercise can demonstrate political commitment. A structured exercise programme developed over years creates capability.
Logistics and sustainment
Maritime operations depend on fuel, maintenance, spare parts, port access, medical support, communications, accommodation and supply chains. Different vessels and systems create different sustainment requirements.
NATO identifies common concepts, compatible equipment and interchangeable supplies as minimum elements of interoperability. A Red Sea coalition does not need to standardise every platform, but it must understand how multinational forces will be supported, repaired, resupplied and medically sustained during prolonged activity.
Uneven institutional capacity
Not every member enters the coalition with the same resources. Some possess advanced naval forces, established command systems and significant training capacity. Others are building basic coastguard, port-security or maritime-governance capability while managing wider national challenges. The answer should not be to exclude less-developed partners. Their coastlines, local knowledge and jurisdiction are essential. The coalition must instead establish differentiated capability-development pathways that recognise where each institution begins.
Capacity Building Must Extend Beyond Equipment
Security assistance is often measured through visible assets: patrol boats, vehicles, communications equipment, command centres and surveillance systems. These can be important, but equipment does not create an institution. A patrol vessel without trained crews, maintenance systems, operational doctrine, fuel budgets, legal authorities and a functioning command structure may provide less capability than its purchase suggests. A maritime operations centre cannot create shared awareness if participating agencies do not collect information consistently or have no authority to exchange it.
Effective capacity building and security sector reform connects people, institutions and resources. It considers governance, organisational design, doctrine, training, leadership, accountability, logistics, procurement, infrastructure and interoperability as parts of one capability.
This is particularly important where military, coastguard, police, customs, port, fisheries and civil-protection bodies share responsibilities within the same maritime environment. National coordination must improve alongside multinational coordination. A state cannot integrate effectively with regional partners if its own agencies do not have clear roles and reliable mechanisms for working together.
A Realistic Development Pathway
The Red Sea states do not need to begin by attempting to create a fully integrated collective-defence alliance. Early credibility will come from achievable cooperation that produces practical results.
A phased pathway could include:
1. Political and institutional clarity. Define the respective mandates of the Red Sea Council and maritime coalition, establish permanent working structures and agree a limited initial programme.
2. Shared terminology and baseline procedures. Develop common language for maritime incidents, reporting and coordination, supported by agreed operating procedures.
3. Liaison and information exchange. Place national liaison officers within a coordinating function and build a trusted system for sharing non-sensitive maritime information.
4. Joint education and training. Create common learning outcomes for planners, commanders and operators, supported by instructor development and regional professional education.
5. Progressive exercises. Begin with command-post and communications exercises before advancing to increasingly complex maritime scenarios.
6. Capability assessment and development. Identify institutional gaps country by country and align external assistance with agreed regional objectives.
7. Doctrine and lessons learned. Establish a process through which exercises and operations improve future procedures, training and organisational design.
8. Sustainment and long-term financing. Ensure that new structures and assets can be maintained after initial political attention or external funding declines.
Regional Ownership Must Be Genuine
Saudi leadership is central to both initiatives. The Kingdom has the diplomatic weight, resources, coastline and strategic interest required to convene partners and sustain momentum. For the architecture to endure, other members must also see themselves as owners rather than recipients.
African littoral states should participate in defining priorities, doctrine and institutions, not simply provide geography for a security agenda developed elsewhere. Smaller members need meaningful roles suited to their capabilities. National concerns around sovereignty, economic security, fisheries, trafficking, migration and port development must be recognised alongside the protection of international shipping.
This is one of the most valuable lessons from ASEAN: regional cooperation becomes resilient when members perceive the institution as a forum through which their interests can be advanced and differences managed, not merely a mechanism for implementing the priorities of the strongest state. Ownership also affects external partnerships. International navies, organisations and donors can provide expertise, training, technology and investment. Their support should strengthen an agreed regional architecture rather than create competing systems or continued dependence.
A Generational Project Worth Pursuing
The challenges facing the Red Sea Council and the new maritime coalition are immense. Political differences, uneven capabilities, active conflicts, external competition and institutional weakness cannot be resolved by a charter or a single series of exercises. Nor should the initiatives be judged against an unrealistic expectation of immediate NATO-level interoperability.
NATO’s standards and structures were developed across decades because interoperability itself is a continuous process. The Red Sea states will need their own doctrine, institutions and methods, designed for their geography, political realities and operational priorities. The measure of progress should be whether cooperation becomes more regular, procedures clearer, personnel more capable and joint action more credible from one year to the next.
If the Red Sea Council can mature into a functioning regional institution and if the maritime coalition can translate immediate security cooperation into sustained capability development then the region will be better placed to protect its waterways, manage shared risks and engage external partners on more equal terms. That will not create an Arab version of NATO in a few years. It could begin the more important task of building a distinctly regional security architecture capable of lasting for generations.
Building Institutions That Can Operate Together
Stratum Global Risk supports governments, security institutions and international partners with capacity building, security sector reform, doctrine development, training-system design and operational capability development across the Middle East and wider region.